Bundling and the Product Specification of Excludable Public Goods: the Case of Pay TV by Crampes, Claude & Hollander, Abraham
Product Specification, Multi-product Screening and Bundling:
the Case of Pay TV
by
Claude Crampes* and Abraham Hollander**
November 1999  (revised)
*Gremaq and Idei, Université des Sciences Sociales de Toulouse
** Université de Montréal and Centre de Recherche sur les Transports
1
Abstract
The paper asks how a for-profit cable or satellite operator allocates a fixed channel
capacity to different program types and how the different channels are bundled and
priced. It also addresses the question how channel allocation and bundling decisions
made by a for-profit firm differ from the decisions a welfare-maximizing firm would
make. It also examines the effect on profits and welfare of two regulatory constraints
that limit the operator’s choices in regard to the number of distinct bundles that may
be offered to subscribers.
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Introduction
Program selection is one of the more extensively studied problems in television. More
often than not, analysis is inspired by allegations that programming lacks diversity or
claims that the profit incentive induces excessive production of programs with mass-
appeal at the expense of features targeted at minority tastes. Steiner (1952), has shown
that the total number of channels would likely be larger under competition than under
monopoly, but that the latter would yield greater diversity in programming.1 However,
subsequent work by Rothenberg (1962), Beebe (1977), Spence and Owen (1977),
Wildman and Owen (1985), Owen and Wildman (1992) has established that Steiner's
results are very sensitive to assumptions in regard to viewers' willingness to watch
second-to-most preferred programs, to channel capacity, and to the skewness of the
distribution of viewers' preferences.2
A common feature of the aforementioned models is that variety of content is captured
by the number of program categories. More recent work goes a step further as it
investigates the interaction between program diversity and the specification of
individual programs. Waterman  (1992) e.g., examines the outcome of monopolistic
competition when individual operators, each supplying one channel, decide on the
quality of their programming. Papandrea (1997) presents a model in which viewers
have different preferences in regard to program specification and where the size of the
audience is determined by specification and price. He concludes that competition does
to a greater extent than monopoly duplicate programs with wide appeal.
Program specification is also the main focus of this paper which addresses the
following questions: How does a profit-maximizing firm - cable or satellite operator -
allocate channel capacity to different program types? Second, what is the composition
of the bundles or packages offered to subscribers? Because subscribers do not as a
rule pay for individual channels but for a bundle of channels, two questions arise: (a)
What is the number of distinct packages or bundles a profit maximizing cable or
satellite operator will let subscribers choose from? and, (b) what is the optimal
composition of each bundle, i.e., how many channels devoted to each type of
programming should the different bundles contain?
Bundling is customarily viewed as a technique used to extract from consumers surplus
that cannot be extracted when offering goods separately.3 A newer strand of literature
                                                       
1 The intuition behind this result is as follows: A monopolist supplying a number of channels will add
one channel when its contribution to total advertising revenue exceeds the cost of distributing
programs through that channel. A competitive firm by contrast will supply an additional channel
when the advertising revenue accruing to that channel is larger than the cost of programming and
broadcasting. Also, when deciding whether a new channel should be targeted at a minority taste
rather than to the same mass market as existing channels, the competitive entrant is more likely to opt
for the mass market than the monopolist. Indeed, from the perspective of the latter, one more product
with mass appeal does not enhance the size of the audience. A competitive firm by contrast may find
that attracting a slice of the mass market by providing yet another product with mass appeal is more
profitable than catering  to a an audience whose preferred  programs are not fancied by most
viewers.
2 Owen and Wildman (1992) contains an analytical discussion of these models and of related work.
3 Pure bundling refers to a situation where the package is offered for sale but individual products in
the package are not. Mixed bundling describes a situation where consumers are given the option of
buying the package as well as the option of buying the individual products that make up the package.
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emphasizes the role of bundling as a means to deter entry or induce rivals to compete
less aggressively.4  This paper stresses the traditional role but it goes a step further,
throwing a bridge between bundling and product specification. To be sure, the
literature on bundling disregards specification issues as it explores under what
circumstances selling two products as a single package yields higher profits than
selling them separately. Product specification models on the other hand, do not
examine how offering a firm the option to bundle affects its decisions in regard to
product characteristics. In this paper by contrast, the primary focus is precisely on the
interaction between bundling and product specification decisions.
In the specific context of television, bundling has been examined by Chae (1992) who
has looked at economies of scope in the distribution technology. He has examined in
particular how production and distribution costs jointly determine the firm’s decision
whether to offer a single channel as opposed to two channels, and, in the latter case
whether to bundle the two channels. This paper is different in that decisions in regard
of bundling derive solely from consumer preferences. In fact, cost considerations are
ignored altogether in order to underscore more sharply the role played by preferences.
As well, and in contrast to a literature inclined to assume that viewers have a single
most-preferred program type, this paper postulates that the audience consists of
individuals who appreciate variety in programming for its own sake. However,
members of the audience do differ from each other in regard to the utility they draw
from particular combinations of program types.
Section II states the basic assumptions underlying the model. Section III formally
presents the problem of a monopolistic cable or satellite operator facing asymmetric
information about viewers’ preferences. Section IV establishes how the number of
bundles and their composition depend on the distribution of consumer preferences. It
shows in particular that when distinct bundles are offered, one of them is fully
contained in the other. It also shows that when two bundles are offered, prices and
bundle compositions are chosen so as to extract the entire surplus from all subscribers.
This is in contrast to a standard result that states that some surplus is left to the buyers
with the highest willingness to pay.5 Section V explains why the optimal capacity
allocation depends not only on the preferences of the viewers with the highest
willingness to pay, but also on the proportion of the audience made up of such
viewers. This finding is also in sharp contrast to the standard result according to
which the specification of the product targeted at the group with the highest
willingness to pay depends only on the preferences of that group. Section VI
compares choices made by a for-profit firm with those of a welfare-maximizing firm
that may operate under a minimum revenue constraint. It shows that the for-profit
firm supplies too little of the type of programming most favored by the "average"
viewer. The welfare consequences of regulatory constraints that require the operator
to give all subscribers access to all channels or, that prohibit the sale of distinct
bundles are ambiguous and Section VII explores how they depend on the distribution
of preferences. Concluding remarks are found in section VIII.
                                                                                                                                                              
The conditions which would make pure or mixed bundling an effective method for such extraction
are examined in  Stigler (1968), Adams and Yellen (1976), Schmalensee (1984), McAfee et al.
(1989) and Salinger (1995).
4see Whinston (1990) , Carbajo et al. (1990), Chen (1997).
5See e.g. Maskin and Riley (1984), Besanko et al. (1988), Corts (1995).
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II. Notation and basic assumptions
There is a single cable or satellite operator. All programming distributed by that firm
belongs to one of the following types: sports and documentaries. The number of
available channels, referred to as capacity, is technologically given and is denoted x.
Each channel is devoted exclusively to sports or documentaries. The operator must
determine the number of channels to be dedicated to sports - denoted s -  and  the
number of channels dedicated to documentaries - denoted c. The distribution and
acquisition cost of both sports and documentary programs is zero.6
The utility that the viewer indexed θ  derives from access to s sports and c
documentary channels is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )cu1suc,s;V θθθ −+= . The index ( )1,0∈θ  captures
the viewer’s intensity of preference for sports relative to documentaries. The function
u(.) with  u(0) = 0, is strictly increasing and  concave.
Let ( )x,s θ and ( )x,c θ  denote the solution to ( )c,s;Vmax c,s θ  subject to s +c ≤  x and
define ( ) ( ) ( )( )x,c,x,s;Vx,F θθθθ ≡ . The following can now be shown:
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it follows that 2/x*c*s ==  when 2/1=θ . Also, because ( ).'u >0, one has














0, so that the second order condition for a
minimum is satisfied as well.
All members of the audience belong to one or the other of two classes, labeled 1 and
2. Class 1 members value sports programs more than class 2 members, i.e. 21 θθ > .
The proportion of viewers belonging to class 1 is denoted α . The firm is assumed to
know the parameters 21 ,θθ  and α  but to have no information about the class to which
an individual subscriber belongs. Therefore, it cannot engage in first-order price
discrimination. It may, however, offer program combinations – referred to as bundles
– which result in self-selection by subscribers. Technically this is achieved by
                                                       
6 This is a simplifying assumption that makes it easier to underscore the role of preferences in
shaping the profit maximizing solution.
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providing subscribers with unscrambling devices encoded to give them access to a
particular bundle. 7
Figures 1a and 1b display the utility derived by class 1 and class 2 viewers from a
bundle of size x, when the number of sports channels increases and the number of
documentary channels falls by an equal amount.8 Figure 1a illustrates the case
212/1 θθ >> , and Figure 1b the case 21 2/1 θθ >> .
9 Shorthand notation for
( )iii sx,s;V −θ  is iV .
[insert Figures 1a and 1b]
When both classes have access to the same bundle, class 1 derives higher (lower)
utility from access than class 2 when the bundle contains more (fewer) sports channels
than documentary channels. As well, for any bundle of given size,
[ ] [ ]1212 signdsVVdsign θθ −=− . The implication is that the vertical distance
between V2 and V1 falls as s increases from 0 to x/2 Also reflected in Figure 1, is the
fact that the utility derived from any bundle containing an equal number of sports and
documentary channels is independent of θ .
The underpinnings of the utility function are as follows: At any point in time,
subscribers will watch at most one channel. The benefit from having access to more
channels of a particular type - documentaries e.g. - derives from (a) a better chance
that at any time some channel will show a documentary program on a topic that the
subscriber is interested in; (b) a better chance that at any time, some documentary
channel will show a program of sufficient quality to make it worthwhile to set aside
couch time for television. Thus the function u(c) reflects the probability that a
collection of c documentary channels will at any time carry at least one program the
subscriber enjoys watching. When s <x/2< c, the chances of being supplied with at
least one program that meets the required standard, are better for documentaries than
for sports. This explains why class 2 members derive a higher utility than class 1
members from any bundle having more documentary than sports channels. It explains
in particular why, for the particular case 212/1 θθ >> , class 2 members derive a
higher utility than class 1 members even when the allocation of capacity maximizes
the utility of the latter.
Note that ( ) ( ) ( )x,2/1F2/xu2/x,2/x,V ==θ  for all x and all θ . This can be
interpreted as follows: When a bundle provides an equal chance that a sports program
and a documentary program will meet the minimum quality standard, access to that
bundle yields a level of utility that does not depend on the relative preference for
sports or documentaries. Any disparities in willingness to pay for access are then
determined solely by the gaps in the preference for sports relative to documentaries.10
                                                       
7 The limiting case where a viewer is given an unscrambling device that does not give access to even
a single channel, captures an outcome where that viewer does not subscribe to pay-TV.
8  i.e. c = x - s.
9 The case θ1>θ2>½ is not displayed because it is mirror image of Figure 1a.
10 A possibility one may consider is that the two groups also differ in their preference for television
in general. This can be captured by specifying that
=)c,s,(V iiiθ { }2,1i,v)c(u)1()s(u iiiii =−−+ θθ , where v1 - v2 denotes the gap in their appreciation
for television in general. The following sections will assume v1 = v2 = 0 . However, care will be
taken to point out which results depend on this assumption.
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III. Statement of the problem
Profit maximization requires that the service provider decide on the following: (a)
How to allocate a given channel capacity across sports and documentary channels; (b)
whether to offer a single package to both classes of viewers or, target a different
package at each class; (c) when offering two packages, how many sport channels and
how many documentary channels to place in each package; (d) how to set the price
either of the single package or, of the two packages.
The number of channels devoted to sports and documentaries in the package targeted
at class i  consumers is denoted is and ic  respectively, and the price of the package
targeted at viewers belonging to class i  is denoted ip . The operator’s objective is to
maximize profits subject to several categories of constraints. First, there are
participation constraints [shown as (1) and (2) below], which state that consumers in
each subscribing class must obtain non-negative surplus11
( ) ( ) ( ) 11111 pcu1su ≥−+ θθ 1µ (1)
( ) ( ) ( ) 22222 pcu1su ≥−+ θθ 2µ (2)
Second, there are self-selection constraints – (3) and (4) below – stating that whenever
distinct bundles are offered, consumers in each class must derive a higher surplus
from the bundle targeted at them than from the bundle targeted at the other class.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2212111111 pcu1supcu1su −−+≥−−+ θθθθ 1λ (3)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1121222222 pcu1supcu1su −−+≥−−+ θθθθ 2λ (4)
Finally, technical constraints stating that the total number of channels subscribed to
cannot exceed the channel capacity [see (9) below] and, that the number of channels
of a particular type contained in a bundle, cannot exceed the total number of channels
devoted to that type of programming [see (5) – (8) below].
ss1 ≤ 1sγ (5)
ss2 ≤ 2sγ (6)
cc1 ≤ 1cγ (7)
cc2 ≤ 2cy (8)
xcs ≤+ β (9)
The problem of the firm is to maximize the profit function ( ) 21 p1p ααΠ −+=  with
respect to 212121 c,c,s,s,p,p , s and c , subject to constraints (1) – (9).
12
                                                       
11 The µ ’s which appear next to constraints (1) and (2) as well as the λ ’s, γ ’s and the β  shown
next to the constraints (3) – (9), are the Lagrange multipliers used in the proof of the Appendix.
12 Note that when the two classes do not derive the same utility from a bundle that contains the same
number of sports and documentary channels, the participation constraints have a different form. e.g.
7
This problem presents itself as multi-product screening problem since the utility of
each subscriber depends on two variables, si and ci, 
13. It will become clear in sections
below that the very specific characteristics of cable and satellite TV, captured by the
constraints (5)-(9), facilitate the search for a solution. One specific attribute is a
limited number of channels. The latter rules out the possibility of giving both classes
access to x channels and yet differentiate between bundles. It remains possible though
to target a different bundle at each class because the decoders can be programmed to
deny access to certain channels.
IV. Bundle composition for a given capacity allocation
Let {s, c} denote the allocation of capacity between channel types and let [ *is ,
*
ic ]
denote the composition of the optimal bundle targeted at subscriber i.14
Characterization of the maximum is carried out stepwise.15 The first result (Lemma 2)
is that the firm targets a bundle that contains all channels devoted to a specific type of
programming at the class of viewers most inclined towards that type. Because θ1>θ2 
this means:
Lemma 2:  *1s =s and 
*
2c =c
To understand this result suppose that two distinct bundles were offered and that s1  <
s. If, the participation constraint of class 1 were binding, then increasing the number
of sports channels in the bundle targeted at class 1 by a small amount ds1, allows the
seller to increase the price charged to class 1 by an amount equal to 1θ u’(s1)ds1.
Doing so does not, however, bring about a switch by class 2 subscribers to the bundle
targeted at class 1 because the utility class 2 viewers derive from the bundle targeted
at class 1 only increases by an amount 2θ u’(s1) ds1, i.e. it increases by a smaller
amount than the increase in price of the bundle targeted at class 1. If on the other
hand, the participation constraint of class 1 is not binding, then its self-selection
constraint must be binding and so must the participation constraint of class 2. The
implication is that ( ) ( ) ( )2222211111 c,s,Vc,s;Vc,s;Vp θθθ +−= . Again profits are
increasing in with s1 since p1 increases with s1 while p2 remains unaffected. The
implication is that a profit maximizing 2-bundle cannot have s1 < s. It is clear as well
that s1 = s2 < s cannot hold for an optimal 1-bundle offer since increasing s1 = s2
                                                                                                                                                              
when the reservation value of class i is vi > 0  (see footnote 10) the participation constraint of class i
reads iiiiii vp)c(u)1()s(u ≥−−+ θθ  The self-selection and technical constraints remain
unchanged.
13 Generally, the analytical treatment of multidimensional screening problems requires additional
assumptions on the structure of preferences, e.g. to reduce it to a one dimensional problem as in
Corts (1995) or, to restore the monotonicity of optimal contracts as in Matthews and Moore (1987)
or to assume that the agent’s preferences satisfy the single-crossing property for each product
(Armstrong and Rochet 1999). Our model is based on a particular specification of preferences that
follows the Armstrong-Rochet’s additively separable definition. Moreover, our hypothesis of a
perfect negative correlation between the parameters that characterize preference for the two types of
programs (θ, 1-θ) allows to generate simple equilibria.
14 Accolades are used  to denote capacity allocations; square brackets to denote bundle compositions.
15 Explicit proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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would allow an increase in the price charged to both classes. By similar reasoning one
shows *2c =c.
The second step involves the elimination of outcomes in which both groups subscribe
to bundles that contain less than the total number of channels devoted to programming
of the type towards which they are less inclined than the other group. Formally,
Lemma 3: i) if *1c < c  then 
*
2s = s;    ii) if 
*
2s < s then 
*
1c = c
This Lemma states that if one class is offered fewer than the total number of channels
belonging to one type, the other class is offered all the channels belonging to the other
type. To understand this result, consider a hypothetical solution where c1 < c and s2 <
s. It is clear that the only reason a profit-maximizing firm would choose to target at
class 1 a bundle containing fewer than the total number of documentary channels, is
that doing so would allow it to charge a higher price for the bundle targeted at class 2
without inducing a switch by class 2 viewers to the bundle aimed at class 1. However,
when s2 < s, there exists a way to increase p2 that is less costly in terms of forgone
profit contribution by class 1 subscribers. It is simply to increase s2. The upshot is that
a solution where c1 < c will only be chosen when 
*
2s = s. A similar reasoning shows
the second part of the Lemma.
Jointly Lemmas 2 and 3 imply that at least one class will subscribe to a bundle that
contains all the channels.  The next Lemma shows that when two distinct bundles are
offered, the smaller one will contain an equal number of sports and documentary
channels.
Lemma 4:    i) if *1c  < c,  then 
*
1c  = s         ii) if 
*
2s  < s,  then 
*
2s  = c
Consider part i) and take as a starting point the offer of the bundle [s, c] at the price
( )c,s,V 1θ . If ( ) ( )c,s;Vc,s;V 12 θθ <  only class 1 subscribes and one never has c1<c.
If V( ;2θ s, c) > V( ;1θ s, c) both classes subscribe; the participation constraint of class 1
is binding whereas that of class 2 is not. Examine now the consequences of targeting
the same bundle at class 2, while targeting at class 1 a bundle that contains the same
number of sports channels but fewer documentary channels. With two bundles on
offer, self-selection constraints become relevant. Because class 1 subscribers were
initially on their participation constraint, the price of the smaller bundle must be set
below the initial price charged for the bundle [s,c] in order to prompt class 1 members
to subscribe to the smaller bundle. Specifically, the amount by which price must be
lowered is dp1 = (1- 1θ )u'(c1)dc1.
How do these changes in c1 and p1 affect the maximum price that can be charged to
class 2?  The answer follows from the condition that states that the self-selection
constraint of class 2 is binding. The latter implies dp2 = [(1- 1θ )-(1- 2θ )]u'(c1)dc1.
Because 1θ > 2θ , it must follow that a lower c1 is accompanied by a higher p2.  The
effect on profits is d Π =α dp1+(1-α )dp2=( 1v θθ − )u'(c1)dc1, where vθ ≡1-
( )( )211 θα −− . A first implication is that lowering c1 below c - i.e. offering two
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distinct bundles rather than a single bundle - can only be profit maximizing when
1v θθ < . Otherwise profits are higher under a single bundle offer.
Considering the case 1v θθ < , there remains the question by how much c1 should be
lower than c. In this regard, note that reducing c1 while maintaining class 2
subscribers on their self-selection constraint shrinks the surplus of class 2 subscribers
because dp2/dc1 < 0.  Indeed, the composition of the bundle they purchase remains
unchanged while p2 increases. The smallest feasible c1 is attained when the
participation constraint of class 2 becomes binding. This happens when c1 = s. Indeed,
when the composition of the small bundle is (s, s) and p1=u(s), both class 1 and class
2 derive zero surplus from subscribing to the smaller bundle.16  Therefore, the optimal
p2 is that which removes the entire surplus from class 2 members when they subscribe
to the bundle [s, c]. 17 The proof of part ii) is based on the difference 2w θθ − , where
wθ ≡ 1αθ  but otherwise proceeds along identical lines.
From Lemmas 2-4, it follows that for any capacity allocation {s, c} the candidate
bundles [ *i
*
i c,s ] are:
a) For  c > s : Two solutions









implying )s(up1 =  and ( ) )c(u1)s(up 222 θθ −+=
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b) For c < s: Two solutions
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implying ( ) )c(u1)s(upp 2221 θθ −+==
c) For c=s : One solution
sss *2
*




1 ==  implying )2x(upp 21 ==
                                                       
16 Recall that a bundle containing an equal number of sports and documentary channels yields the
same utility to both classes
17 When v1-v2 is not zero, it remains true that all surplus is taken from class 2 viewers. However, the
way to do it is no longer c1 = s. Now c1  must satisfy (θ1 − θ2) [u(s)- u(c1)] =  v2  −  v1 . The latter is
obtained when the participation constraints of both class and the self-selection constraint of class 2
are binding. Note that s>(<)c1 when v2>(<) v1.
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V. The allocation of channel capacity
The results derived so far are valid for any capacity allocation between sports and
documentary channels. Yet to be answered is the question how capacity is allocated
optimally among channel types. In this regard, it is obvious that one chooses  s < x/2
< c when 2/112 << θθ  regardless of whether one or two bundles are offered and
one sets s >x/2> c when 1/2 < 2θ  < 1θ . The case 2θ < ½ < 1θ  is less clear because a
priori the optimal solution could be s > c, s < c  or s = c.  The optimal number of
sport and documentary channels as a function of  θ1, θ2  and α  are given below.
Proposition 1
i) For 2/112 << θθ  , the optimal channel allocation has s* < c* = *sx −  with





for 1v θθ ≥ (1-bundle)
u’(s*)/u’(c*)   =
ii) For  122/1 θθ << , the optimal channel allocation has  s* > c* *sx −=   with





for 2w θθ ≤ (1-bundle)












  for  
2
1
w >θ ⇒ s* > c*  (2- bundle)
*)c('u
*)s('u
= 1  for  wv 2
1








v <θ   ⇒ s* < c*   (2-bundle)
Proof : see appendix
To gain an intuitive grasp of Proposition 1, note that for any capacity allocation where
s<c, the profits derived from a 2-bundle offer are equal to the profits gained from
offering the bundle [s, c] to a “virtual” class that includes all viewers and has
preference intensity θv=1-(1-α )(1-θ2). The utility a virtual viewer derives from the
bundle [s, x-s] is displayed in Figure 2 for the case 1v θθ <  as Vv = V( vθ  ,s, x-s).
[insert Figure 2]
The condition 1v θθ <  insures that Vv > V1 for all s < x/2 and, therefore, the profit





   otherwise (2-bundle)
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channel allocation is a function of the preference parameter of class 2 and of the
proportion of viewers represented by that class; it does not depend on the preference
parameter of class 118. By contrast, when v1 θθ <  one has, Vv < V1 for all s<x/2 and
profit maximization dictates a 1-bundle offer specified to maximize class 1 utility.
Similarly, when s > c, the profits from an optimal 2-bundle offer are equal to the
profits from offering the bundle [s, c] to the "virtual" class with preference parameter
1w αθθ = . A 2-bundle offer is optimal when 2w θθ >  .
It is useful at this point to contrast the solution obtained here with the solutions that
emerge from standard screening models.19 Two differences are striking. First, that in
this model both participation constraints are binding whenever 2 bundles are offered.
Second, that a 2-bundle offer always entails distortions at the bottom and at the top.
The model presented here differs from the standard screening model in two significant
ways: (1) It is multidimensional; (2) the limited channel capacity x adds a technical
constraint to the problem. To understand the importance of the latter consider the
consequences of removing the technical constraint.20 With that constraint gone, the
optimal solution for 2θ < 1θ <½, is to target at class 2 a bundle that maximizes the
utility of that class; i.e. the solution requires that one set the number of sports channels
equal to s2  (see Figure 2) and, that one target at class 1 a bundle that contains a
number of sports channels larger than s1. This solution displays the standard result;
i.e. the participation constraint is binding for the class with the lowest willingness to
pay and the self-selection constraint is binding for the other class. The latter also
enjoys positive surplus.21
Now bring back the technical constraint. At this point it is impossible to offer two
distinct bundles containing x channels. If one maintained a capacity allocation that
maximizes the utility of class 2,  - i.e. {s2, x-s2} – and made an optimal 2-bundle offer,
total profit would be V(θv, s2, x-s2) (point A in Figure 2). This profit would be the
weighted average of u(s2) i.e. the profit from class 1, and V(θ2, s2, x-s2), i.e. the profit
derived from class 2, with weights α and 1-α respectively. Since the function V2 is
horizontal at s=s2 whereas u(.) has positive slope, the weighted average of the slopes
of these  functions - which is the slope of Vv - is positive at s=s
2 . This explains why it
is optimal to "distort" the bundle targeted at class 2. The distortion is optimally chosen
when the allocation of capacity is {sv, x- sv}, i.e. where the weighted sum of the slopes
of V2 and u(s) is zero.
                                                       
18 It can be noted that Vv converges to V2 when α tends to zero.
19 Such as e.g. Maskin and Riley (1984).
20 One could imagine a cable-distributor who controls two systems, each with x channels and
constrained to selling a single system per subscriber.
21 This is hardly surprising because, for a given capacity totally allocated to a subscriber, the problem
is one-dimensional and one has 0sV2 >∂∂∂ θ , that is the model satisfies the standard single crossing
property.
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Thus, profit maximization requires a distortion at the top in order to gain additional
profits from the class at the bottom. The bundle targeted at the bottom class is
distorted as well since it contains fewer channels than are available on the system.22
To gain a clearer picture of the results enunciated by Proposition 1, consider Figures
3.a and 3.b that show the equilibria associated with different 1,θα  and 2θ . Looking at
Figure 3.a the following is readily apparent:
[Insert Figures 3a and 3b ]
1) When 1θ  and 2θ  are adjacent (areas I.a, I.b and I.c), a single bundle is optimal.
2) Although the capacity allocation and the number of bundles depend on 1θ  and
2θ  they are not necessarily affected by small changes in these parameter values.
Specifically, neither profits nor specifications depend on 1θ  ( 2θ ) in area I.a  (I.b).
The reason for this "local " insensitivity is that product specification and prices
depend only on the preferences of the group whose participation constraint is
binding. The horizontal lines shown in area I.a of figure 3.a are therefore iso-
program as well as iso-profit lines. Similarly, the vertical lines in areas II and I.b
are iso-profit and iso-program lines. Within the area I.c, neither profits nor capacity
allocation are affected by small changes in 1θ  or 2θ  .
3) As the size of the majority group increases, area II grows at the expense of areas
I.c and I.a. Similarly, area II shrinks as α tends towards 1/2. The upshot is that the
firm is more likely to offer two bundles when the majority is strong and the gap in
preferences is large
4) Profits are lowest for parameter values in the area I.c where they are equal to
u(x/2). Within area II, profits increase and programming contains more sports as
one moves to the right. Similarly, profits increase and content tends towards more
sports as one moves upward inside I.a. Programming contains more documentaries
and profits increase as one moves to the left inside I.b.
VI. Bundling and the allocation of capacity by a welfare-maximizing firm
How do capacity allocation and bundling decisions by a for-profit firm differ from
those made by a welfare-maximizing firm? The problem of the latter is to maximize
(10) below, subject to the constraints (5)-(9)
)c,s;(V)1()c,s;(VW 222111 θαθα −+= (10)
When the welfare maximizer is under the obligation to generate a minimum amount
of revenue -possibly to cover costs- the constraints (1)–(4) and (11) below also apply.
                                                       
22 This policy is not unlike the strategy of differentiation that calls for the creation of a low quality
variety, possibly at additional cost, in order to allow in price discrimination. (see Deneckere and
MacAfee (1996).
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α p1 + (1-α)p2  K≥ where K 0≥ (11)
It is helpful to start with the case where (11) is not binding. In this case, welfare
maximization requires that all viewers be given access to all channels i.e. s1= s2 =s
and c1=c2=c and s+c=x. The objective function is therefore W(s,c)= mθ u(s)+(1-
mθ )u(x-s), where 21m )1( θααθθ −+=  denotes the average preference of the public
for sports. Clearly, the optimal capacity allocation  - denoted (sm, cm) - must satisfy the
first order condition u'(sm) / u'(x-sm) = (1- mθ ) / mθ . Also, W(s
m, cm) = V( mθ ; s
m, cm) =
F( mθ , x). This implies:
Proposition II
The number of channels that a private monopoly allocates to sports is too large (too
small) from a welfare point of view when the average viewer has a weaker (stronger)
preference for sports than for documentaries, i.e. when mθ <(>)½.
Proof: It is straightforward to show that
),max(),(min 21 wmv θθθθθ >> (12)
Consider the case θm<½,  a condition that is always met when 2θ < 1θ <½.
23 By virtue
of Proposition 1, 2θ < 1θ <½, entails s* = min (s
1, sv)< c*. Hence, s*> sm by  virtue of
(12) and Lemma 1(i). The condition mθ <½, is also met when 2θ <½ < 1θ  and α is not
too large.24 Recall from Proposition 1 that when 2θ <½ < 1θ  the for-profit firm may
choose either s*<c* or s* ≥ c*. However, s*>c* is possible only when wθ >½, a
condition that cannot hold when mθ <½ .If it held, (12) could not be true. Therefore,
one must only deal with the case s* ≤ c* which implies s* = min (x/2, sv). But then, it
follows again from (12) and Lemma 1(i) that s*> sm .
The standard argument is that there will be an excess supply of the type of program
preferred by the majority group. In our model such claim means that the number of
sports channels would be too large if θ1>1/2 and α >1/2.  But Proposition II shows
that the question whether or not there is oversupply of particular type of program
depends only on the sign of θm -½. This means in particular that when the majority
group prefers sports to documentaries the number of sports channel will be smaller
than optimal when the average viewer also prefers sports.
Examine now the case where (11) is binding and mθ <½, i.e. the case where
K>V( 1θ ;s
m, cm). 25 As mθ < min( 1θ , vθ  ), one has W(s, c) > max {V( 1θ ; s, c), V( vθ ; s,
c)} for all s<x/2 and sm < min ( v1 s,s ).26 There are two sub-cases to examine.
                                                       
23 The proof for the case mθ >½ proceeds along similar lines.
24 The condition is )/())2/1(( 212 θθθα −−< .
25 The case θm>½ will not be dealt with since it is analyzed in the same way.
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Sub-case i) 1θ < vθ
Because V( 1θ ; s, c)>V( vθ ; s, c), the 1-bundle offer yields higher revenue for any
capacity allocation than any 2-bundle offer based on that same allocation. The
implication is that the only adjustment that lets the firm meet the revenue constraint is
one that increases the number of sports channels at the expense of documentary
channels. Such adjustment lowers welfare. The constrained maximization has a
solution only as long as K ≤ F( 1θ , x) = V( 1θ , )sx,s
11 − .27
Sub-case ii) 1θ > vθ
Figure 4 displays V1,V2, Vν  and W as functions of s when c=x-s. This is the more
interesting case because two different adjustments allow the firm to meet the revenue
constraint. The first adjustment is the same as above, i.e. a change in channel
allocation; the second adjustment is a switch to a 2-bundle regime.28
[Insert Figure 4]
Because two adjustments are now possible, the following questions arise : Is one of
them always less costly in terms of welfare that must be surrendered to generate the
required revenue? If not, how does one determine the combination of adjustments that
minimizes the loss in welfare?
Consider first the reallocation of capacity. For any s<s1, welfare forfeited per dollar of
increased revenue is (dW/dK)a =[ mθ  u'(s) - (1- mθ )u'(x-s)]/ [ 1θ u'(s)-(1- 1θ )u'(x-s)].
29
As to the welfare cost of the switch to a 2-bundle regime where c1 is reduced while
the capacity allocation remains constant, the amount of welfare forgone per dollar of
increased revenue is (dW/dK)b = )/()1( 1v1 θθθα −−
30. The latter is independent of s
whereas (dW/dK)a is decreasing in s.31 For s = vs  where V( vθ ; s, x-s) attains a
maximum, one has (dW/dK)a = (dW/dK)b . Also, sign [(dW/dK)a - (dW/dK)b]= sign
(sv-s). Therefore one concludes that:
                                                                                                                                                              
26 Recall that sv satisfies the condition u'(sv) / u'(x- sv) = (1- θv) / θv while s1 satisfies u'(s1)/u'(x-
s1)=(1-θ1)/θ1.
27 To see the latter, it is sufficient to show that a higher revenue cannot be attained by selling to class
2 alone i.e. that (1-α)F(θ2, x) < F(θ1,x). Defining s2 = argmax V(θ2; s, x-s) it is easy to show that
F(θ1,x) > V(θ1; s2, x- s2) > V(θv; s2, x- s2) = (1-α) V(θ2; s2, x- s2)+ α u(s2)>(1-α) V(θ2; s2, x- s2)=
(1-α) F(θ2, x).
28 Recall from the proof of lemma 4 that lowering the number of documentary channels included in
the bundle targeted at class 1 increases revenue by increasing the price that can be charged for the
large bundle targeted at class 2.
29 To see this, note that dK= [θ1u'(s)-(1-θ1)u'(x-s)]ds and that dW= [θmu'(s)-(1-θm)u'(x-s)]ds.
30 In this case, because p2= V(θ2; s2, c2) - V(θ2; s1, c1)+ V(θ1; s1, c1), one has dK=αdp1+(1-
α)dp2={α(1−θ1) +(1-α)[(1-θ1)-(1- θ2)]}u'(c1)dc1 =[θv−θ1]u'(c1)dc1  and  dW = α(1−θ1)u'(c1)dc1.
31 The sign of d(dW/dK)a/ds is the same as that of [θmu’’(s)+(1-θm)u’’(x-s)]dV(θ1; s, x-s)/ds -
[θ1u’’(s)+(1-θ1)u’’(x-s)] dV(θm; s, x-s)/ds. As u’’<0, and dV(θ1; s, x-s)>0> dV(θm; s, x-s) for
s∈ ]sm, s1[, one has d(dW/dK)a/ds<0.
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For K [ ]),,(),,,( 11 vvmm sxsVsxsV −−∈ θθ  the firm maintains the 1-bundle
offer and meets the revenue constraint by increasing the number of channels devoted
to sports.
For K [ ]),,(),,,( 1 vvvvv sxsVsxsV −−∈ θθ  the firm maintains the capacity
allocation at {sv, x-sv} and lowers c1 as K increases. When K equals the lower bound
of the interval, welfare is V( mθ ; s
v, x- sv)  - point D in Figure 4 – and revenue is
V( 1θ ;s
v,x- sv) - point C in Figure 4. As K increases and the firm responds by lowering
c1, welfare falls while revenue increases. When K equals the upper bound of the
interval, both welfare and revenue are equal to each other. They are given by the
distance between point E in Figure 4 and the horizontal axis. Point E is the solution
chosen by the profit- maximizing firm. Finally, note that there is no feasible solution
when K> )sx,s,(V vvv −θ
So far the effects of imposing  (11) have been examined only for the case 2θ < 2θ <½.
But, as pointed out earlier, mθ <½ may also hold when 2θ <½< 1θ . By virtue of
Proposition I, one knows that when 2θ <½< 1θ  the profit maximizing firm may,
depending on parameter values, offer a single bundle having s=c=x/2, two bundles
with s>c if wθ >½ or two bundles with s<c if vθ <½.  Note though that by virtue of
(12), mθ <½ entails wθ <½. Therefore the argument unfolds as before, except that the
choice now is between having two bundles designed to maximize the utility of the
virtual viewer vθ  and a single bundle with s=c=x/2 and yielding u(x/2). Findings are
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition III
When  mθ <½ a welfare maximizing firm subject to a minimum revenue requirement K
chooses the following capacity allocations and bundle compositions:
a) If K ≤ V( 1θ , s
m, x-sm) the capacity allocation is {sm, x-sm} and a single bundle
containing all channels is offered to both classes.
b) If K>V( 1θ , s
m, x-sm) there are two cases to consider
           If 1θ ≤ vθ  then
for K ≤ V( 1θ ; s
1, x-s1) capacity allocation is {s( 1θ , K), x-s( 1θ ,K)}with
s( 1θ ,K)=arg[V( 1θ ; s, x-s)=K]; one bundle containing more than the
 welfare maximizing number of sports channels is sold to both classes.
for K>max [V( 1θ ; s
1, x-s1),u(x/2)] there is no solution.
If 1θ > vθ  then
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for K ≤ V( 1θ ; s
v, x-sv), capacity allocation is the same as above,
i.e.{s( 1θ ,K), x- s( 1θ ,K) }; one bundle containing more than the welfare
maximizing number of sports channels is sold to both classes.
for V( 1θ ; s
v, x-sv)< K ≤ V( vθ ; s
v, x-sv) the capacity allocation is {sv, x-
sv}. Two bundles are offered.  The large bundle with composition [sv, x-
sv ] is targeted at class 2; the small bundle targeted at class 1 has





 for K> V( vθ ;s
v,x-sv) there is no solution.
These findings can be set against Chae (1992) where the bundling and pricing choices
of a private monopolist are compared to those of a welfare-maximizing firm. Chae
assumes a continuum of viewer types and the existence of one or two channels with a
priori specified content.33  Although his results are driven primarily by differences in
production and distribution costs relative to reservation prices, whereas ours depend
solely on parameters of the distribution of preferences across viewer classes, the two
papers yield results that, in some regards, can be compared. Chae finds that a welfare
maximizer engages in pure bundling, a for-profit firm prefers mixed bundling, and the
profit- constrained welfare maximizer may choose either option. We find that the non-
constrained welfare maximizer offers a single bundle, i.e. a choice that translates into
a single price as for pure bundling. The 2-bundle solution chosen by the profit-
maximizing firm for some parameter values entails distinct prices as is the case for
mixed bundling. We also find that the revenue-constrained welfare maximizer may
offer one or two bundles depending on the severity of the revenue constraint i.e. the
solution is, as it were, intermediate between that chosen by a for-profit firm and that
chosen by a non-constrained welfare maximizer.
VII. Regulation of the conditions of access
Consider now the effects on profits and welfare of the following regulatory
constraints: (1) the obligation to make all channels accessible to both groups; (2) the
prohibition to sell a bundle containing fewer channels than the total available on the
system. Again we limit the analysis to the particular case where 2/112 << θθ . To
establish a baseline, we examine first how profits and welfare evolve as functions of
α in the non-constrained equilibrium. In this regard, we note that for all
                                                       
32 When the participation constraint is binding for class 1 and the self-selection constraint is binding
for class 2, the budget equation reads ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] Kc,s;Vc,s;V)1(c,s;V 112222111 =−−+ θθαθ . As
class 2 receives the large bundle [sv, x-sv] and class 1 receives the small bundle [sv, c1], we obtain the
relation in the text.
33 Chae addresses the following questions: (1) How is the choice between pure component pricing (i.e
each channel is priced separately) and bundled pricing affected by production and distribution cost?
(2) How do costs determine whether the firm provides programming for both channels, for one
channel only  ( if so for which channel) or, no programming at all? In this paper by contrast, there
are only two viewer classes but the firm can choose a capacity allocation from a continuum of
possibilities. In terms of Chae’s model, this comes close to an endogenization of channel content.
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[ ]1),1/()( 221 θθθα −−∈ , profit maximization dictates that a single bundle be sold to
all consumers at the price )x,(F 1θ .
34 Whereas profits remain constant for all α ’s in
that interval, welfare declines with α  because it includes the surplus of class 2
subscribers – equal to [ ] )x,(Fc,s;V 1112 θθ − . Figure 5 displays profits and welfare for
[ ]1),1/()( 221 θθθα −−∈  as segments BA and CA.
[Insert Figure 5]
For ( ) ( )( )221 1/,0 θθθα −−∈ , the for-profit firm offers two bundles and sets prices
that leave no surplus to either class 1 or class 2 subscribers.35 Hence profits coincide
with welfare. They are given by )x,(F vθ  and shown as DB in Figure 5. Lemma 1
and 0/v >∂∂ αθ  imply that DB is downward sloping.
36  The discontinuity in the
welfare function at α = ( ) ( )221 1/ θθθ −−  is attributable to the fact that the size of the
bundle targeted at class 1 suddenly drops at this point.
Regulation 1: All viewers must have access to all channels
Imposing the obligation to grant all subscribers access to all channels is tantamount to
setting a price ceiling ),( 1 xF θ  when 2/112 << θθ , except if α =0. Profits are also
)x,(F 1θ  and are shown as AH in Figure 5. It is obvious from Figure 5 that profits are
not affected by the constraint when α  is sufficiently large; they are lowered by it
when α  is small.
Under the regulation, welfare is ),;()1(),( 1121 csVxF θαθα −+  and is shown as
segment GA in Figure 5. Because welfare tends to ),(),;( 2
11
2 xFcsV θθ <   as α tends
to zero, it must be true that DB and GC intersect at 0>α . The implication is that
imposing the regulation is welfare increasing or decreasing depending on the
proportion of viewers in each class. The regulation is more likely to increase welfare
when the proportion of viewers who absent the constraint would subscribe to the
smaller bundle is larger.
Regulation 2: No bundle may contain fewer channels than is available on the system.
Under this regulation, the question is whether the firm is better off selling to both
groups and at a price )x,(Fp 11 θ=  the bundle specified to maximize the utility of
class 1 viewers, or whether the firm does better by selling to class 2 only and at a
price )x,(Fp 22 θ=  the bundle specified to maximize class 2 utility. Figure 6 displays
the profits from of the two options as segments HA [profits )x,(F 1θ ] and DR [profits
)x,(F)1( 2θα− ] respectively.
[Insert Figure 6]
                                                       
34 See area Ib in figures 3a and 3b.
35 We are in area III in figure3b.
36 Recall that ( )( )2v 111 θαθ −−−≡
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The former (latter) yields higher profits for [ ]),(/),(1)( 21 xFxF θθα −<> . It is
evident from Figure 6 that profits are strictly lower under the regulation when
))1/()(,0( 221 θθθα −−∈ , and that they are unchanged for α outside that interval.
In regard to welfare, the impact of the regulation is ambiguous. For
[ ]),(/),(1 21 xFxF θθα −<  welfare equals profits when the constraint is binding and,
profits themselves are lower than in the absence of regulation. Imposing the regulation
must therefore be welfare decreasing.37
 For [ ])1/()(,)(F/)(F1 22121 θθθθθα −−−∈  welfare under the regulation is given
by JC in Figure 6. It is higher than welfare in the absence of regulation, given by SB.
The reason regulation may either increase or decrease welfare is as follows: For α
slightly smaller than )1/()( 221 θθθ −− , the bundle offered under regulation to class 2
is only faintly different from the bundle targeted at that class in the absence of
regulation. Hence, the effect of regulation is essentially to force the operator to set a
price at which group 1 purchases the larger bundle. This adjustment is welfare
increasing. However, a lower price becomes more costly when α  becomes larger.
This explains why the firm prefers to target only class 2 as soon as α  drops below
[ ]),(/),(1 21 xFxF θθ− . For smaller α , imposing the constraint affects welfare in two
ways: (i) it changes channel allocation; (2) it excludes class 1which in the absence of
the constraint purchases the smaller bundle.38
VIII. Conclusion
This paper has examined pricing, capacity allocation and bundle composition
decisions by a monopolistic cable or satellite operator. Using a model that assumes
two classes of viewers and two programming types, it has established that whenever
two distinct bundles are offered to subscribers, one bundle will contain all the
channels supplied by the distributor. The implication is that a subset of channels will
be made accessible to all subscribers. This is in conformity with the practice under
which a basic service is paid for by all subscribers, while additional channels are
purchased by some subscribers. A second result is that a two-bundle offer is more
likely to yield higher profits than a single bundle offer when: (1) the disparity in
consumer preferences is larger; (2) the size of the group having the strongest
preference for the type of programming favored by the average consumer is larger
relative to the size of the other group. A third finding is that when two bundles are
offered, prices and bundle compositions are chosen so as to remove all consumer
surplus from subscribers. This is in contrast to the standard result that has surplus left
to those with the highest willingness to pay. Also in contrast to that literature, the
                                                       
37 Recall that in the latter case welfare is given by DS.
38 The constraints investigated in this section apply to the conditions of access and the number of
bundles offered. This is in contrast to Chae (1992) who looks at the consequences of imposing either
a pure-bundling or a pure-components restriction on prices. Chae finds that the pure bundling
restriction  -which is close to our regulation 2 because it forces the firm to become a single product
producer - can be welfare decreasing or increasing. In his model, the bundling restriction increases
total surplus unless it induces the monopolist to produce fewer channels. In Chae, welfare and
consumer surplus decrease when the pure bundling restriction induces the firm to produce fewer
channels. In our set-up welfare falls when the constraint induces the firm to withdraw from making
an offer to one class of viewers.
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paper finds that the specification of the product sold to the group with the highest
willingness to pay is not chosen to maximize the utility of that group. It is chosen to
maximize a utility that depends on the preferences of that group and on the group's
share of the total audience.
The paper also addresses the question how the choices made by a for-profit firm
depart from those made by a welfare maximizer. It finds that whenever the average
viewer has a stronger preference towards a particular type of program, a profit-
maximizing monopolist allocates fewer channels to that type than is optimal. The
number of channels allocated to the type preferred by the majority group will not be
excessive unless the average viewer has stronger preference for programs of the other
type. In this sense, the model presented in this paper fails to lend support for the claim
that private markets lead to insufficient programming targeted at minority tastes.
The paper has also established that a welfare maximizer subject to a mildly restrictive
revenue constraint will offer a bundle containing all channels to all viewers. However,
the channel allocation to a particular content will differ from that chosen by a welfare-
maximizing firm that is not subject to such constraint. As the minimum required
revenue increases, the channel allocation chosen by the constrained welfare-
maximizing firm comes closer to the allocation that maximizes the utility of the class
with the lowest willingness to pay. As the constraint becomes even more restrictive, a
threshold may be crossed where the welfare maximizer switches to a 2-bundle regime.
If such point is reached, further tightening of the constraint is met by reducing the size
of the smaller bundle. This increases revenue but lowers welfare. The switch to a 2-
bundle offer occurs only when the distribution of preference parameters is such as to
induce a for-profit firm to offer two bundles. When this condition is satisfied, the
allocation of capacity by the welfare-maximizing firm that offers two bundles is the
same as that of the for-profit firm.
The effects of two regulatory constraints have also been explored. First the obligation
to give all potential subscribers access to all channels. The welfare effect of such
requirement is ambiguous. It does not affect welfare when parameter values dictate to
an unregulated firm to offer a single bundle. It increases welfare if absent the
regulation, preferences and relative group sizes dictate a channel allocation only
slightly different from that chosen by the regulated firm. However, when the group
with the highest willingness to pay for a particular type of program is a strong
majority, imposing the constraint is welfare decreasing. The second constraint this
paper has examined is a prohibition to sell bundles that include less than the total
number of channels on the system. The paper has shown that such prohibition
increases welfare when it brings about a switch from a two-bundle offer to a single
bundle offer targeted at all potential subscribers. However, this comes about only
when the group that would have purchased the larger bundle in the absence of the
constraint is a relatively weak majority. However, as the proportion of viewers
belonging to that group grows larger, it becomes less costly to satisfy the constraint by




Since the objective function of the monopolist is concave and the feasible set convex,
first order conditions describe a global maximum. With L denoting the Lagrange
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plus the constraints (1)-(9) in the text.39
Lemma 2: Under profit maximization, *1s =s and 
*
2c =c
Proof: Note first that ss*1 <  implies 01s =γ  which, by virtue of (A3) requires
( ) 022111 =−+ θλµλθ . This implies ( ) 022112 <−+ θλµλθ  since 21 θθ > ,
contradicting (A1) since 0>α . Hence, it must be true that ss*1 = . A similar series of
steps establishes cc*2 = .
Lemma 3: i) if *1c < c  then 
*
2s = s;   ii) if 
*
2s < s then 
*
1c = c
Proof: If both inequalities held, (A4) and (A5) would imply
( )( ) ( )22111 11 θλµλθ −=+−  and ( ) 11222 θλλµθ =+ . In view of (A1) and (A2) these
equalities could be rewritten ( )( ) ( )2221 11 θλλαθ −=+−  and ( ) 1112 1 θλλαθ =+− .
Since the latter would entail 01 >λ  and 02 >λ , conditions (3) and (4)  in the text
would have to be binding. But then, summation of (3) and (4), and Lemma 2 would
imply ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }*1*221 cucususu −+−−θθ =0. This equality, however, cannot be true
for both ss*2 <  and cc
*
1 < , since 21 θθ > .
Lemma 4: i) if *1c  < c,  then 
*
1c  = s;       ii) if 
*
2s  < s,  then 
*
2s  = c
Proof: Consider part (ii).40 When ss*2 < , one has 02s =γ . By virtue of (A5), we
obtain ( ) 11222 θλµλθ =+  which entails that one of the following must hold:
                                                       
39 Also, each multiplier is non-negative and the product of each constraint with its multiplier is zero.
40 The proof of part (i) involves going through the same steps as for part (ii) and will not be shown.
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(i) 01 >λ  and  02 >λ   and/or  02 >µ
(ii) 0221 === µλλ .
Since (A2) rules out (ii), one can immediately turn to the implications of (i). In regard
of (i), note that when 01 >λ , then (3) in the text, by virtue of Lemma’s 2 and 3,
yields ( ) ( )[ ] 2121 ppsusu −=−θ (A8)
Now suppose 02 >λ , a condition which in view of (4) and by virtue of Lemma’s 2
and 3 entails ( ) ( )[ ] 2122 ppsusu −=−θ (A9)
Clearly, (A8) and (A9) contradict each other. The implication is that 01 >λ  must
entail 02 =λ  and 02 >µ . But, when 02 >µ  holds, condition (2) reads
( ) ( ) ( )cu1sup 2222 θθ −+= (A10)
Note, that upon use of (A10), condition (A8) can be rewritten
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2221 susucu1sup −−+ θθθ (A11)
and (A10) and (A11) jointly imply
















The latter indicates that 2s  is to be chosen either at the upper bound or at the lower
bound of its feasible interval, depending on the sign of 12 αθθ − . When 12 αθθ > ,
profit maximization dictates that 2s  be as large as possible, i.e. ss
*
2 = . It dictates that
2s  be as small as possible when 12 αθθ < . Since conditions (A11), (1) in the text and
the inequality 21 θθ >  imply cs2 ≥ , it follows that cs
*
2 =  when 12 αθθ < .
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Proof of Proposition 1: The proof contains two parts. In the first part it is shown that










and 121 =+ µµ (A13)
In the second part, this result is used to determine the allocations of capacity
associated with different values of parameters 1,θα and 2θ .
a) Note first that (A13) follows from the summation of (A1) and (A2). In regard of
(A12) note that (A7) entails 
2121 ccss
γγγγ +=+ . Therefore, summation of (A3) with
(A5) and summation of (A4) with (A6) yield
[ ] [ ]11222222111 )()s('u)()s('u θλµλθθλµλθ −++−+
[ ] [ ])1())(1()c('u)1())(1()c('u 11222221111 θλµλθθλµλθ −−+−+−−+−=  (A14)
                                                       
41 Clearly, this outcome is possible only when c<s.
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Consider now the following two possibilities: i) ss*2 = , and ii) ss
*
2 < . When ss
*
2 = ,
the left-hand-side of (A14) can be rewritten as [ ]2211)s('u θµθµ + . When ss*2 < , one
has 0
2s
=γ  and, since the latter implies 0)( 11222 =−+ θλµλθ  one obtains
[ ] [ ]221122111 )s('u)()s('u θµθµθλµλθ +=−+ . Thus, the left-hand-side of (A14) is
the same regardless of whether *2s  is smaller or equal to s . By following a series of
similar steps one shows that the right-hand-side of (A14) is always equal to
[ ]22111)c('u θµθµ −− . This completes the proof of (A12).
b) Consider now the case 2/112 << θθ , one has 2
1
2211 <+ θµθµ  by virtue of (A13).
Since 0"u < , the latter implies *c*s <  [see (A12)]. The question to be answered
now is under what conditions the latter entails an offer of two bundles. Because the
optimal capacity allocation entails more documentary than sports channels, it is the
sign of 1v θθ −  that determines the number of bundles.
42 When 1v θθ ≥  a single
bundle is offered and therefore, profits are maximized by choosing the allocation that
yields the highest willingness to pay by the class having the lower utility whenever s
< c, i.e. class 1. The optimal allocation (s1, x- s1) must satisfy the first order condition
1θ u'(s)-(1- 1θ )u'(x-s)=0.
43 By contrast, when vθ < 1θ , profit maximization entails a 2-
bundle offer with profits Π =α p1+(1-α )p2=[1-(1-α )(1- 2θ )]u(s)+(1-α )(1- 2θ )u(c).
The optimal allocation (sv, x- sv) is given by the first order condition [1-(1-α )(1-
2θ )]u'(s)- (1-α )(1- 2θ )u'(x-s) = 0. Since vθ =1-(1-α )(1- 2θ ), this completes the proof
of part i) of proposition 1. The proof of part ii) proceeds along similar lines.
Consider now part iii) of the proposition. Since V1 is an increasing function of s for s
< x/2 and V2 is a decreasing function of s for s > x/2 ( see figure 1b), it must be true
that an optimal 1-bundle offer has s = c = x/2. The question is how the profits yielded
by the latter bundle, i.e.  u(x/2)=F(½, x) compares to the profits derived from an
optimal 2-bundle offer. Look first at the candidate 2-bundle offer where s<c. The
highest profits one can derive from such 2-bundle offer is F( vθ , x) with vθ =1-(1-
α )(1- 2θ ) and lemma 1 has established that F( vθ , x) – F(½, x) > 0 when vθ  < ½..
When the optimal 2-bundle yields the higher profits, the profit function has the same
form as for the case 2/112 << θθ  . Therefore, the allocation of capacity must satisfy
the same first order condition as for the 2-bundle offer in part i). Look now at a
candidate 2-bundle solution where s > c. By virtue of Lemma 1, profits from this 2-
bundle offer are higher than those from a 1- bundle offer when wθ > ½. When this
condition is met, the allocation of channels capacity must satisfy the same first order
condition as under the 2-bundle offer of part ii) of the proposition.
                                                       
42 See summary of candidate solutions at the end of  section IV.
43 It should be noted for further reference that when α > ½ a single bundle is offered for all θ2 <θ1
<1/2. Similarly, α < ½ insures that a single bundle is offered for all 1/2<θ2 <θ1   .
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Figure 1a: θ2 < θ1 <
1
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Figure 3b : Equilibrium configurations for α < 1/2
Ia : s1 = s2 = s > x/2 > c = c1 = c2 and p1 = p2 = θ2u(s) + (1− θ2)u(c)
Ib : s1 = s2 = s < x/2 < c = c1 = c2 and p1 = p2 = θ1u(s) + (1− θ1)u(c)
Ic : s1 = s2 = s = x/2 = c = c1 = c2 and p1 = p2 = u(x/2)
II : s1 = s > x/2 > c = c1 = c2 = s2 and p1 = θ1u(s) + (1− θ1)u(c) and p2 = u(c)
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Figure 5 : Profit and welfare when the monopolist is obligated





























Figure 6 : Profit and welfare when the monopolist is not allowed
to sell two different bundles
